Chickamauga, GA.
September 19-20, 1863

Chickamauga, Ga., Sept. 19-20, 1863. Army of the Cumber-
land. At the battle of Chickamauga the Union forces, commanded
by Maj.-Gen. William S. Rosecrans, were organized as follows:
the 14th corps, Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, was made up of the
four divisions of Baird, Negley, Brannan and Reynolds; the 20th
corps, Maj.-Gen. Alexander D. McCook, consisted of the three
divisions of Davis, Johnson and Sheridan ; the 21st corps Maj.-
Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, included the divisions of Wood,
Palmer and Van Cleve; the reserve corps, Maj.-Gen. Gordon
Granger, was made up of the divisions of Steedman and Daniel
McCook; the cavalry corps, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Mitchell,
embraced the divisions of Col. Edward M. McCook and Brig.-Gen.
George Crook. The effective strength of the entire Army of the
Cumberland was slightly less than 60,000 men of all arms.

The Confederate army, commanded by Gen. Braxton Bragg, was
divided into the right and left wings. The right, commanded by
Lieut.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, was composed of Cheatham's division
of Polk's corps; Lieut.-Gen. D. H. Hill's corps, consisting of
Cleburne's and Breckenridge's divisions; the reserve corps,
Maj.-Gen. W. H. T. Walker, including the divisions of Walker
and Liddell. The left, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. James Long-
street, embraced Hindman's division of Polk's corps; Long-
street's corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood, and con-
sisting of the divisions of Hood and McLaws; Buckner's corps,
Maj.Gen. Simon B. Buckner, including the divisions of Stewart,
Preston and Bushrod Johnson; Wheeler's cavalry, including the
divisions of Wharton and Martin; and Forrest's cavalry, con-
sisting of the divisions of Armstrong and Pegram. The total
strength of the army was not far from 72,000 men.

For several days prior to the engagement both armies had
been maneuvering for position. Several attempts had been made
by Bragg to cut off and destroy detachments of the Union army,
but they had failed, either because of the tardiness of his
officers in executing his orders, or because the movements were
discovered by the Federal commanders in time to thwart the
designs. On the 17th McCook's corps was in McLemore's cove,
between Stevens, and Dug gaps, with the remainder of the army
in easy supporting distance. For the first time since the
crossing of the Tennessee river the Federal forces were in
position where they could be quickly concentrated. And it was
well that such was the case, for Bragg, having failed to strike
the army in detail, was contemplating a movement in force
against Rosecrans. The 17th was occupied by him in getting his
troops in position along the east bank of the Chickamauga.
Wheeler, with his two divisions of cavalry, was to make a feint
against the troops at McLemore's cove, while Forrest was to
cover the right and front to prevent the Federals from gaining
knowledge of Bragg's intentions and preparations. Bushrod
Johnson's brigade came up from Ringgold and was assigned to a
position at Reed's bridge, on the extreme right of the line.
Walker's corps, about 6,000 strong, took position at Alexan-
der's bridge on Johnson's left. Next in order came Buckner's
corps, which was stationed near Tedford's ford. Then came
Polk's corps, drawn up opposite Lee & Gordon's mills, with Hill
on the extreme left. Late in the day two brigades came up from
Mississippi and were united with Johnson's, thus forming a
division of three brigades at Reed's bridge. That evening
Bragg issued his orders for the whole line to move at 6 o'clock
the next morning, cross the Chickamauga, and advance on the
Federal position. His plan was for Johnson to cross at Reed's
bridge, strike the Union left and force it back toward Lee &
Gordon's mills, the other portions of the line to cross in
succession and continue the assault from right to left,
constantly pressing the Federals on the left and rear.

The plan was well conceived, but, as frequently happens in
war, a series of unforeseen occurrences prevented its success-
ful execution. When Johnson began his forward movement on the
morning of the 18th he was so delayed by the stubborn resis-
tance of Minty's and Wilder's cavalry that it was 3 P.M. be-
fore he gained possession of the bridge. In the meantime ,Hood
had arrived on the field and was assigned to command the divi-
sion, which was further strengthened by the addition of three
brigades belonging to Longstreet's corps. As soon as the
bridge was gained Hood rushed his troops across and swept
southward to the point where Walker was to cross and resume the
assault. The Federal cavalry had been engaged throughout the
forenoon in making an extended reconnaissance along the entire
front and had developed the enemy's position. Finding Walker
about to cross at Alexander's bridge, Wilder massed his brigade
of mounted infantry at that point and, after a sharp skirmish,
succeeded in destroying the bridge. This compelled Walker to
cross at Byram's ford several hours behind schedule time. It
was 5 P.M. before Hood had reached a position where he could
menace Wilder's flank, and the latter retired toward Gordon's
mills. Night fell with only about one-tenth of Bragg's army
across the Chickamauga and again his plans had failed.

The fighting at the two bridges, in connection with the
reconnaissance, had so far indicated the Confederate plan of
operations as to cause a radical change in the position of the
Union troops. At 4 P.M. Thomas concentrated his corps at
Crawfish Spring, where he received orders to move northward to
the Chattanooga and Lafayette road and take up a position at or
near Kelly's farm. He arrived there about daylight on the 19th
and stationed his command to cover the roads leading to Reed's
and Alexander's bridges. The morning of the 19th, therefore,
found the Union army with its right resting at Crawfish Spring,
where the left had been on the preceding day while the left was
several miles north, prepared to contest the possession of the
road, which Bragg had hoped to occupy without apposition, thus
giving him an easy line of march to the Federal rear. The bat-
tle was opened on the 19th, by Thomas. Col. Daniel McCook,
whose brigade had been stationed during the night on the road
leading to Reed's bridge, reported the destruction of the
bridge about 4 A.M., and that the only force of the enemy he
could discover on the west side of the stream was one brigade,
which might be cut off. Thomas ordered Brannan to send forward
two brigades for this purpose, and to support Baird with the
rest of his division., About 10 A.M. Croxton's brigade became
engaged with Forrest's cavalry, gradually forcing him back for
about half a mile upon two brigades of infantry - Wilson's and
Ector's - who raised the "rebel yell" and in turn forced Crox-
ton to retire until Baird came to his support, when the Confed-
erates were again driven for some distance, a number of prison-
ers being taken. This action of Croxton's brought on the
battle of Chickamauga before the Confederate troops were in the
positions assigned them. It also gave Bragg the first know-
ledge of the fact that his right was overlapped by the Union
left, and that his flank was in danger of being turned by Tho-
mas. Hurriedly changing his plans he halted Walker who was
marching toward Lee & Gordon's mills, and ordered him to make
all possible speed to the relief of the right wing. Croxton's
men had almost exhausted their ammunition and were moved to the
rear to renew the supply. Baird's. and Brannan's divisions
were then united and after some severe fighting drove Walker
from their front. Baird had halted to readjust his line, when
he was struck on the flank by Liddell's division, and two bri-
gades - Scribner's and King's - were thrown into disorder and
their batteries captured by the enemy. Just at this juncture
R. W. Johnson's and Reynolds' divisions arrived and were imme-
diately formed on the right of Baird. As soon as they were in
position the line advanced, attacking Liddell on the flank and
rear, driving him back for a mile and a half, while Brannan's
men met him in front and recaptured the guns taken from Baird's
brigades, the recapture being effected by the 9th Ohio at the
point of the bayonet. Cheatham's division was then rushed to
the support of Liddell, but Thomas had also been strongly rein-
forced and the Confederates were driven back upon their
reserves, now posted along the west bank of the Chickamauga
between Reed's and Alexander's bridges. This was followed by a
lull of about an hour in which Brannan and Baird were posted in
a position on the road leading from Reed's bridge to the
Lafayette road north of Kelly's and ordered to hold it to the
last extremity. About 3 P.M. a furious assault was made on
Reynolds' right and Brannan's division was sent to his
assistance, Croxton's brigade arriving just in time to check
the enemy in an effort to turn Reynolds' flank and gain his
rear. Again Thomas reformed his line and about 5 o'clock the
enemy assaulted first Johnson and then Baird, but both attacks
were repulsed with considerable loss to the assailants. This
ended the fighting for the day.

On the evening of the 19th, Rosecrans met his corps com-
manders in council at the house of Mrs. Glenn, and the plans
for the next day's battle were arranged. Thomas was to main-
tain his present position holding the road to Rossville, with
Brannan's division in reserve. Davis, division of the 20th
corps was to close on Thomas' right, and Sheridan's division
was to form the extreme right of the line. Crittenden was to
have two divisions in reserve near the junction of Thomas' and
McCook's lines, ready to reinforce either as circumstances
might require. Davis and Sheridan were to maintain their pick-
ets until they were driven in by the enemy. The reserve corps,
under Granger, and the cavalry were to keep open the line of
communications to Chattanooga. The Confederate line was also
somewhat rearranged. Beginning at the right it was made up of
the divisions of Breckenridge, Cleburne, Cheatham and Walker,
the last two being in reserve. The left wing began with
Stewart's division, which touched Cleburne' left, followed in
order by Johnson and Hindman. Hood was in reserve behind John-
son, Preston was in reserve on the extreme left, and Humphrey
and Kershaw, who had come up during the night, were also held
in reserve. Longstreet arrived about 11 P.M. on the 19th and
assumed command of the left wing.

Although Bragg had failed to accomplish his ends on the
18th and 19th, he still adhered to his original plan of
successive attacks from right to left, in an effort to force
the Union army up the valley. Orders were accordingly issued
for Breckenridge's division to attack at dawn on the 20th his
assault to be followed rapidly by the other divisions through-
out the entire length of the line, but constantly forcing back
the Federal left until the road to Chattanooga was in posses-
sion of the Confederates. Before daylight Bragg was in the
saddle near the center of his line anxiously waiting for the
sound of Breckenridge's guns. The morning dawned red and sul-
try, with a dense fog hanging over the battle-field. During
the night the Union troops had thrown up temporary breastworks
of rails, logs, etc., behind which a line of determined men
awaited the onset. Eight o'clock came and still no attack.
Bragg then rode to the right and found the troops unprepared
for an advance. All the energy possible was exerted to begin
the action, but it was 9:30 before Breckenridge moved. Cle-
burne followed fifteen minutes later and the fight was on.

At 2 A.M. Thomas had received word from Baird that his
left did not rest on the road to Reed's bridge, as it was
intended to do, and that to reach the road he would have to
weaken his line. Thomas immediately sent a request to head-
quarters for Negley's division to be sent to the left to extend
the line to the road, and received the assurance that the re-
quest would be granted. At 7 A.M. Negley was not in position
and Thomas sent one of his staff to hasten him forward and to
point out the ground he was to occupy. About the same time
Rosecrans rode along the line and personally ordered Negley to
lose no time in joining Thomas, at the same time directing
McCook to relieve Negley and close up his line more compactly.
Upon reaching the left of the line Rosecrans became convinced
that the attack would begin on that flank, saw the importance
of holding the road, and again rode back to hurry Negley's
movements. The division then moved to the left with Beatty's
brigade in advance, and Rosecrans directed Crittenden to move
Wood's division to the front to fill the gap in the line caused
by Negley's removal.

The assault of Breckenridge fell mainly on Beatty's bri-
gade soon after it was in position on the left and it was
driven back in confusion. Several regiments of Johnson's
division, with Vanderveer's and Stanley's brigades, hurled
themselves into the breach, checked the advance of the enemy
and finally drove trim entirely from Baird's flank and rear.
Immediately following the opening attack the Confederate line
advanced, striking Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds in quick suc-
cession. But, from behind their improvised fortifications, the
Federals met the assaults with a bravery and determination
seldom equalled on the field of battle. Fresh troops were hur-
ried forward by Bragg, who now made a desperate effort to drive
in the center and turn Thomas' right. Again and again the Con-
federates advanced in the face of that merciless fire and each
time they were repulsed with fearful slaughter. Finding all
his efforts in this direction futile, Bragg fell back to his
old position.

About 11 A.M. Wood received an order from headquarters to
"close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him."
In the execution of this order a gap was left in the line,
which Davis undertook to close with his reserve brigade. But
Longstreet had observed the break in the line and was quick to
take advantage of it. Before Davis could get his reserves into
position the divisions of Stewart, Hood, Kershaw, Johnson and
Hindman came rushing through the opening, sweeping everything
before them, while Preston's division pressed forward to the
support of the assailants. McCook vainly endeavored to check
the impetuous charge of Longstreet's men with the three bri-
gades of Heg, Carlin and Laiboldt, but they were as chaff be-
fore the wind. He then ordered Walworth and Lytle to change
front and assist in repelling the assault. For a time these
two contended against an overwhelming force, temporarily
checking the enemy in their immediate front. But the Confeder-
ates, constantly increasing in numbers, succeeded in turning
the left of these two brigades and they were forced to retire
to avoid being surrounded. In this part of the engagement Gen.
Lytle was killed and Hood seriously wounded. Wilder and Harri-
son joined their commands with that of Sheridan to aid in re-
sisting the fierce attack, but a long line of the enemy was ad-
vancing on Sheridan's right and he was compelled to withdraw to
the Dry Valley road in order to save his command. Subsequently
he moved toward Rossville and effected a junction with Thomas,
left on the Lafayette road. In his report Rosecrans says:
"Thus Davis' two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's
entire division were swept from the field, and the remainder,
consisting of the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Reynolds, Bran-
nan, and Wood, two of Negley's brigades and one of Van Cleve's,
were left to sustain the conflict against the whole power of
the rebel army, which, desisting from pursuit on the right,
concentrated their whole efforts to destroy them."

This tells the situation. Not only were the troops on the
right driven from the field, but several thousand men were made
prisoners 40 pieces of artillery and a large number of wagon
trains fell into the hands of the enemy. When McCook's forces
were compelled to fall back in confusion they were not pursued.
Instead, Longstreet reversed the order of battle, and when
Stewart's division reached the Lafayette road it became the
pivot upon which the left wing turned to the right instead of
to the left, with the intention of crushing the forces under
Thomas.

At 11 A.M. Granger and his chief of staff were seated on
the top of a hay-rick at Rossville. Through his glass Granger
could see the clouds of smoke, constantly increasing in volume,
while the sounds of the battle grew louder every moment. Scan-
ning the road to the south he saw that no attack was likely to
be made on his position, and rightly surmising that the whole
Confederate strength was being massed against Thomas, he said
to his chief "I am going to Thomas, orders or no orders."
Sliding off the hay-rick he hurriedly directed Dan McCook to
station his brigade at McAfee Church, to cover the Ringgold and
Lafayette roads, then went to Steedman and ordered him to take
his command "over there," pointing toward "Horseshoe Ridge"
where Thomas was making his last stand. Along the crest of
this ridge Thomas had placed Wood's and Brannan's divisions,
while on the spurs to the rear was posted his artillery. If
Wood had inadvertently brought about the disaster by the with-
drawal of his division, causing the gap in the line, he now
retrieved himself. From 1 P.M. until nightfall he bravely
held his portion of the ridge, repulsing several obstinate and
determined attacks of the enemy. One of these attacks was
made by Bushrod Johnson, who reformed his line on a ridge
running nearly at right angles to the one on which Brannan and
Wood were posted. Longstreet reinforced Johnson with the divi-
sions of Hindman and Kershaw, the object being a movement in
force against the Federal right and rear. Just at this criti-
cal moment Granger and Steedman arrived and reported to Thomas,
who ordered them into position on Brannan's right. Granger
then ordered a charge on the Confederate lines. Steedman
seized the colors of a regiment and led the way. Inspired by
the example of their commander the men hurled themselves upon
the enemy and after twenty minutes of hot fighting drove him
from the ridge which was held by Steedman until 6 P.M., when
he fell back under orders. The arrival of Granger's troops was
a great advantage to Thomas in another way. By some mistake
the latter's ammunition train had been ordered back to Chatta-
nooga at the time the Union right was routed, and the supply
was running low, when the arrival of Granger with about l00,000
rounds put new courage into the men as it was distributed among
them. To add to the supply the troops went among the dead and
gathered all they could from the cartridge boxes of their
fallen comrades and foes alike. Toward the close of the day
the order was given to husband the ammunition and use the bayo-
net as much as possible. Some of the late charges of the Con-
federates were repulsed with the "cold steel" alone. The gal-
lant stand of Thomas, and the generalship he displayed in hold-
ing Horseshoe ridge in the face of superior numbers, won for
him the significant sobriquet of the "Rock of Chickamauga."

When Longstreet broke the Union line at noon Rosecrans
himself was caught in the rout. Believing that his army was
doomed to certain defeat, he went to Chattanooga to provide for
the security of his bridges and, as he says in his report, "to
make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and
supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops
into good position." The first official intelligence that Tho-
mas had of the unfortunate occurrence on the right was about 4
p. m. when Gen. Garfield, Rosecrans, chief of staff, arrived
from Rossville. Notwithstanding the disheartening news, Thomas
decided to hold his position until nightfall, if possible. The
remaining ammunition was distributed and instructions given to
his division commanders to be ready to move promptly when or-
ders to that effect were issued. At 5:30 Reynolds received the
order to begin the movement. Thomas himself went forward to
point out the ground he wanted Reynolds to occupy and form a
line to cover the withdrawal of the other troops. While pass-
ing through a strip of timber bordering the Lafayette road
Thomas met two soldiers, who had been in search of water, and
who informed him that a large body of the enemy was drawn up in
line in the woods just in front advancing toward the Union
lines. Reynolds was ordered to change the head of his column
to the left, with his right resting on the road, and charge the
enemy. At the same time the artillery opened a converging fire
from both right and left, while Turchin made a dashing charge
with his brigade, utterly routing the Confederates and driving
them clear beyond Baird's position on the left, capturing over
200 prisoners. Robinson's and Willich's brigades were then
posted in positions to cover the retirement of the troops, the
former on the road leading through the ridge, and the latter on
the ridge to the right. Wood, Brannan and Granger fell back
without molestation, but Baird, Johnson and Palmer were at-
tacked as they were drawing back to their lines. This attack
was made by L. E. Polk's division, but by this time it had be-
come too dark to move with certainty, and in advancing the Con-
federate line was changed so that it formed an acute angle, the
troops firing into each other. The withdrawal from the field
was accomplished with such precision and quietness that it was
not discovered by Bragg until after sunrise the following morn-
ing. Thomas took up a position in the vicinity of Rossville
and remained there during the 21st, retiring to Chattanooga
that night. Bragg's army had been so severely punished in the
two days' fighting that he was disinclined to continue the con-
flict. Some desultory skirmishing occurred on the 21st, but no
general movement was undertaken.

The Union losses in the battle of Chickamauga, according
to the official reports, were 1,657 killed, 9,756 wounded, and
4,757 missing. The Confederate losses, as given in "Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War," amounted to 2,389 killed, 13,412
wounded, and 2,003 missing.


Source: The Union Army, vol. 5